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One of the occasionally difficult or perplexing elements of New Zealand's 
colonial legal heritage is the discovery of a point of law which is governed 
by, or may be affected by, an English or United Kingdom statute of greater 
or lesser antiquity and comprehensibility. Discovering whether such a statute 
exists, or has application to any particular problem can be a matter of 
considerable difficulty, requiring at times considerable research. This comes 
about largely because of the manner in which British law was introduced, 
or considered to be introduced, to this country. The common law had, well 
before any British claims to New Zealand had been put forward, recognised 
that in those British colonies acquired by settlement, the British colonists took 
with them elements of English law, though only those elements that were 
applicable to the circumstances of the colony1. The principle found statutory 
embodiment in section 1 of the English Laws Act 1858 (N.Z.) and, until the 
passing of the Imperial Laws Application Act, continued to be of application 
through the English Laws Act 1908. 
The application of this apparently simple proposition has not been without 
difficulties - in particular in relation to whether English statutes which related 
to activities not current in the colony at the time of inheritance were applicable 
when the activities later became common in the colony. The New Zealand 
courts produced no clear rule for this2 and the jurisprudence of other colonies 
was little, if at all, clearer3. The question of the applicability of common law 
rules has perhaps caused fewer conceptual difficulties, but by its nature no 
general elucidation of the criteria for applicability could properly occur, and 
the whole process of discovery was dependent on the accidents of litigation. 
Reform of the law was, in essence, the only way to resolve the difficulties 
caused by the uncertainty as to whether British or English statutes or elements 
of the common law were in force in this country. Such reform has been 
slow in coming, but it has, at last, arrived. The Imperial Laws Application 
Act 1988 has radically altered the law, and as such becomes the first point 
of reference on any issue relating to the operative elements of inherited law. 
As such, it is one of the most important and far-reaching statutes of recent 
times. There are a number of separate, though related, issues presented by 
the Imperial Laws Application Act, both in relation to the statutes repealed, 
and in relation to the law preserved. A number of the issues raised merit 
substantial discussion, both in relation to the content of the Imperial Laws 
' Blackstone, Commentaries (15th ed.), Vol. 1, p.106 - the curious statement in Hight and 
Bamford, Constitutional History and Law of New Zealnnd p. 119-120 that the principle derives 
from the judgment of Lord Mansfield C.J. in Campbell v. Hall (1774) 1 Cowp. 204; 98 
E.R. 1045 is based on an alleged dictum not to be found in the reports of that case. 
Contrast Brett v. Young (1882) N.Z.L.R. 1 S.C. 262 with Ruddick v. Weathered (1889) 7 
N.Z.L.R. 491 and Re Lushingron, Manukau County v. Wynyard[1964] N.Z.L.R. 161. 
Compare Cooper v. Stuart (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286 with @an Yick v. Hinds (1905) 2 
C.L.R. 345; and see Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London, Stevens, 
1966) pp. 544-547. 
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Application Act, and its related legislation, and to the methodology its 
preparation. 
11 BACKGROUND TO THE IMPERIAL LAWS APPLICATION ACT 
The aim of the act was to clarify the position of old English or British 
statutes in our law, and to provide for the preservation of those where, for 
one reason or another, retention was necessary. The statute was the result 
of a very long-drawn out period of research and consultation with various 
interested parties, including the New Zealand Law society4. The results of 
this process were embodied in several earlier Bills drafted by Parliamentary 
Counsel, (largely the work of the late Mr. J.G. Hamilton, former Chief 
Parliamentary Counsel). The whole area was also investigated by the Law 
Commission and was the subject of the Commission's inaugural report5. The 
task, not surprisingly, took a number of years. The first bill was introduced 
into Parliament in 1981; the final version only received the royal assent as 
the Imperial Laws Application Act in 28th of July 1988, and came into force 
on the 1st of January 1989. 
New Zealand has been able to benefit from the activities of Australian 
law reformers - several Australian states have conducted similar exercises, 
though with some results which differ from the New Zealand experience. 
%toria was the first of the Australasian jurisdictions to begin the process 
of patrialising its statute books - the work of a committee chaired by Sir 
Leo Cussen which culminated in the Imperial Acts Application Act 1922 (Vic.) 
was followed more recently by further reports in the 1970s and the passage 
of the Imperial Law Re-enactment Act 1980 (Vic.) and the Imperial Laws 
Application Act 1980 (%c.). These reforms were paralleled by the Imperial 
Laws Application Act 1969 of New South Wales, the Imperial Laws Application 
Act 1984 (Queensland) and the Imperial Laws Application Ordinance 1986 
and Imperial Acts (Substituted Provisions Ordinance) 1986 (A.C.T.) - both 
these last were amended in 1987. Proposals for reform in South Australia 
have apparently yet to result in legislation. These reports and statutes have 
obviously been of great assistance in the preparation of the New Zealand 
enactment, although the trans-Tasman approach has not been entirely uniform6. 
There is a parliamentary commitment by the Minister of ~ustice' to the 
eventual publication of much of the detail of the research that went into 
the final form of the Imperial Laws Application Act, including in particular 
the schedules to the bill explaining why particular enactments are, or are 
not, preserved. The publication of such material is an unusual step, but not 
The writer had the pleasure of serving on a New Zealand Law Society sub-committee on 
the Imperial Laws Bill ( together with Messrs. W.G.C. Templeton and G.B. Chapman of 
Auckland). 1 would like to acknowledge the assistance I have gained from their comments 
on the Bill, and to thank Mr. Templeton, the Convenor of the sub-committee, for permission 
to use for the purposes of this article material 1 received or prepared for the purposes of 
the sub-committee's work. 
"Report on Imperial Legislation in Force in New Zealand " (1987). Hereafter cited as "Report". 
The Queensland statute shows a considerable divergence from other Australian legislation, 
preserving a number of statutes which are repealed as obsolete in other jurisdictions and 
which were not retained in the New Zealand statute. Such unusual retentions include the 
Crimes by Governors of Colonies Act 1698, 11 Will. 3 c.12; the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 
1802,42 Geo. 3 c.85 and the Commissariat Accounts Act 1821, 1 & 2 Geo. 4 c.121. 
' 488 N.Z.P.D. 4256. 
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unprecedented8. Certainly many researchers will in the future find such a 
publication of great value. 
It is clear that the draft Bill prepared by the Law Commission has been 
the dominant influence in the final shaping of the Imperial Laws Application 
Act, since the earlier drafts by Parliamentary Counsel are considerably more 
complex, and provided for a far greater number of retained statutes, as well 
as for very complex procedures for determining the authoritative text of older 
English statutesg. The problems which may arise from the form of the enacted 
provisions relating to the ascertainment of the text of preserved enactments 
are considered below. It is significant that the Law  omm mission's proposed 
list of preserved enactments is remarkably close to that prevailing in the final 
version of the Imperial Laws Application Act, and would appear in large 
part to have been preferred over the rather shorter list recommended by 
Parliamentary ~ o u n s e l l ~ .  
The Imperial Laws Application Act must be read in conjunction with a 
number of other acts passed at the same time, which were designed to insert 
into the relevant New Zealand statute certain provisions from earlier English 
acts. There were six such accompanying amendments whose provisions cover 
a number of matters, some unsurprising, others which give rise to unusual, 
and perhaps unintended, results. The more predictable and uncontroversial 
substituted enactments include the Crown Proceedings Amendment Act 1988 
(which abolished the action for writs of intrusion); the Crimes Amendment 
Act 1988 (which, perhaps unnecessarily, confirmed that breach$ of any Imperial 
statute or subordinate legislation are not punishable under section 107 of the 
Crimes Act 1908) and the Shipping and Seamen Amendment Act 1988, which 
repealed two English Statutory Instruments relating to shipping1'. 
Rather more surprising is the formal restatement in the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1988 of the power to grant damages in addition to, or in 
substitution for, an injunction or order for specific performance. This power 
was given to the Court of Chancery in England by Lord Cairns's Act (Court 
of Chancery Amendment Act 1858). The English statute, which is essential 
to the flexibility in awarding remedies in equity now possessed by our courts, 
has in recent years been assumed to be applicable in the New Zealand courtsI2 
and thus to be the source of the enhanced jurisdiction the courts possess. 
In reality, it seems that Lord Cairns's Act is not, and never has been, in 
force in this country. The Court of Appeal in Ryder v.   all'^ clearly took 
the view that the Supreme Court had the powers equivalent to those that 
the statute conferred on the Court of Chancery, but these derived not from 
h n e  prior example of such a procedure is the publication in the 1908-1931 Reprint of Statutes 
of the Report of the Commissioners on the Criminal Code Act 1893). 
See e.g. lmperial Laws Application Bill (No. 2) 1985, cl. 3. 
'O The Parliamentary Counsel's drafts would have included in the retained list, among others, 
sections 1 and 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, (1623-4) 21 Ja. 1,  c.3 and the Title, Preamble, 
and section 1 of the Cestui Que Vie Act 1666, 18 and 19 Cha. 2, c.11. 
" The Merchant Shipping (Urgency Signal Order 1932 (S.R. 19451185) and the Merchant 
Shipping (Registration of New Zealand Government Ships) Order 1946 (S.R. 19461 174). 
l 2  See Attorney-General v. Birkenhead Borough [1968] N.Z.L.R. 383 and Souster v. Epsom 
Plumbing Ltd. [I9741 2 N.Z.L.R. 515. 
l 3  (1908) 27 N.Z.L.R. 385. 
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Lord Cairns' Act being in force here, but from the statutory conferring on 
the Supreme Court of the extended Chancery jurisdiction through the operation 
of section 5 of the Supreme Court Act 1862, which declared the Supreme 
Court to have all the jurisdiction that the Court of Chancery then possessed. 
Thus the Judicature Amendment Act would appear to formally conferring 
on the High Court a power which it has had for more than a century. This 
will certainly remove any doubts as to the Court's powers and prevent confusion, 
(as it seems was the desire of some interested parties such as the Law Society), 
but it might be judged to be rather unnecessary. 
The most concerning element of the substituted enactments relates to the 
failure, either in these statutes or in the Imperial Laws Application Act itself, 
to provide for a entirely satisfactory method of ascertainment of the text of 
any preserved statute. Two substituted enactments do bear on this question, 
but it may well be that they do not fully or satisfactorily resolve the possible 
problems. The Acts Interpretation Amendment Act 1988 provides for the courts 
to use, as sufficiently authoritative texts of English statutes in force in New 
Zealand after the Imperial Laws Application Act, any copy produced by the 
Government Printer or otherwise published under the authority of the New 
Zealand Government. This will solve the practical difficulties inherent in 
discovering the text, when and if such a volume is prepared and published 
- indeed the New Zealand Law Society pressed for the early preparation 
of such a volume, in the interests of efficiency and clarity, if the preserved 
enactments were not to be reprinted as Schedules to the Imperial Laws 
Application ~ c t ' ~ .  It may also be observed that the method of identification 
of the authoritative text envisaged by the final version of the act means that 
the final text of legislation in force in this country is not ultimately determined 
by Parliament but by its delegates. This is, in itself, a rather strange constitutional 
device. 
An alternative method of determining the text of the preserved enactments 
is provided for by the Evidence ~mendment  Act 1988.-  his act, apart from 
confirming that witnesses cannot claim a privilege to refuse to answer any 
question tending to establish any debt or civil liability15, provides that it shall 
be sufficient evidence of any imperial act preserved by the Imperial Laws 
Application Act to produce a copy printed by the King's or Queen's Printer 
or by Her Majesty's Stationery Office. This will answer admirably for more 
recent statutes, but some of the older English statutes have never been so 
printed. In any cases not involving a statute officially printed, it will be necessary 
to have recourse to a method not provided in the Imperial Laws Application 
Act or its siblings, and to cite the text as found in Ruffhead's edition of 
the Statutes At Large. Since this edition now has the status in the United 
Kingdom of an official text of those statutes16, it will be possible for the 
Ruffhead text to be taken as authoritative in New Zealand under the provisions 
of section 39 of the Evidence Act 1908. 
There are a substantial number of old statutes preserved by the Imperial 
l4 Submission to Parliamentary Select Committee on the Imperial Laws Application Bill 1986, 
9th February 1987. 
l 5  Repeating the provisions of the Witnesses Act 1806,46 Geo. 3, c.37. 
l6 Interpretation Act 1978 (U.K.) s. 19(l)(c). 
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Laws Application ~ c t " .  These can be divided, more or less satisfactorily, 
into certain functional classes. 
1. Constitutional enactments 
The Imperial Laws Application Act preserves a number of statutes which 
are undoubtedly important both legally and emotionally. Included here are 
statutes which preserve certain of the fundamental elements of New Zealand's 
British constitutional heritage. First place among them deservedly goes to the 
famous words of the First Statute of Westminster 1275 (3 Edw. 1, c.1): 
The king willeth and commandeth . . . that common right be done to all, as well poor as rich, 
without respect of persons. 
Other constitutional enactments preserved include Magna Carta, as adopted 
in 1297 by 25 Edw. I, c.29 and the guarantees of liberty of the individual, 
subject to the due process of law in the certain other statutes related to Magna 
carta18. One may include in this group of preserved statutes, which essentially 
attempt to lay down the basis of the legal relationship of the state and the 
individual, the Petition of Right 1627 and the Bill of Rights 1688 as well 
as the retained provisions of the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640, 1679 and 1816. 
A linked group of preserved statutes essentially relate to the constitutional 
structure of New Zealand. Included here, as part of the necessary framework 
for the constitutional monarchy are the relevant parts of the Act of Settlement 
1700, the Royal Marriages Act 1772 and the Accession Declaration Act 1910. 
More prosaically, the Imperial Laws Application Act also retains the Preamble 
and section 2 of the New Zealand Boundaries Act 1863 and the British 
Settlements Acts of 1887 and 1945. 
2. Statutes relating to the Privy Council 
The Imperial Laws Application Act preserves in force a number of statutes 
dealing with the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, and regulating the procedure 
for appeals from New Zealand courts to that body. The statutes preserved 
are of reasonably formidable proportions, and it is may well be that their 
bulk was one of the reasons for determining not to re-enact the relevant parts 
of the acts as substituted provisions. It is, perhaps, in this area more than 
any other that the failure to re-enact a statute, or at the least to ensure the 
easy availability of an authentic text, may be the cause of annoyance, if not 
of concern. It would surely be far easier to read a separate statutory provision 
than to determine the substance of an enactment preserved in the following 
terms: 
(1833) 3 and 4 Will. 4, c.41 - The Judicial Committee Act 1833; section I [as amended by 
section 1 of the Statute Law Revision Act 1874 (37 and 38 Vict. c.35) and section I of the 
Statute Law Revision (No.2) Act 1888 (51 and 52 Vict., c.570)], section 3, section 5 [as amended 
by section 16 of the Court of Chancery Act 1851 (14 and 15 Vict., c.83)], and sections 6 to 
9, 11 to 13, 15 to 21, 23, 24 and 28 [as amended by section 6 of the Judicial Committee Act 
1843 (6 and 7 Vict., c.38)]. 
l7 The Imperial Laws Application Act also preserves certain subordinate legislation - essentially 
that relating to elements of New Zealand's boundaries or dependencies and regulating 
procedures for appeals to the Privy Council. Other statutory instruments retained relate 
to the prize jurisdiction, merchant shipping and extradition. 
These being (1351) 25 Edw. 3, St.5, c.4, (1354) 28 Edw. 3, c.3, and (1368) 42 Edw. 3, c.3.) 
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3. Land law and Prowrtv law statutes 
The Imperial Laws Application Act also preserves a substantial number 
of statutes relating to land law and real property generally. Some of are major 
historical importance such as the statute of 1289-90 (18 Edw. 1, St. I ,  c. 1 and 
c.3) - always known from its opening words as the Statute of Quia Emptores. 
The majority of the statutes preserved, however, cover, the law relating to 
the partition of land, and to distress for rent. It is in connection with these 
~ r e s e ~ e d  statutes that one of the most notable difficulties with the Im~erial  
Laws Application Act emerges most clearly. The act is designed to be a 
consolidation of existing law, and where there was any substantial element 
of policy choice inherentin the preservation or repeal of a statute, the Imperial 
Laws Application Act, as its drafters were perhaps obliged to do, has opted 
for the status quo. Thus although the statutes preserved may be quite outdated 
and unsuited for modern conditions, they are preserved until at some future 
date substantial reform can be implemented. It is to be regretted that the 
necessary resources, including parliamentary time, could not be found to 
determine the necessity of preserving the enactments, or the desirability of 
re-enacting those that deserved to be maintained in a substituted enactment. 
- 
Much of the detailed work needed to be done on any such reform statute 
has already been done by the Property Law and Equity Reform Committee 
in its Reports of 1983 and 1986. It is perhaps inevitable that no matters which 
might require controversial decisions should be allowed to intrude into the 
final version of the Imperial Laws Application Act, but the decision is 
regrettable. While it will be of assistance to the practitioner to know what 
statutes might be of relevance, there may be occasions where considerable 
research will have to be done to establish whether or not the antique English 
provisions will be relevant. Such research is not rendered any the more easy 
by the text and drafting of the preserved enactments - the Law Commission 
noted, in a supplementary ~ e ~ o r t ' ~ ,  hat the Prescription Act 1832 
has . . . been criticised as strange and perplexing and as one of the worst drafted Acts in 
the statute book . . . In the meantime, however, we include it in the draft schedule. 
And so it remains as part of our law. 
The problems inherent in maintaining on the books a statute whose meaning 
and effect are uncertain are, however, not limited to those concerning real 
property. One of the most interesting survivals from the earlier statutes is 
section 6 of the Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (Lord Tenterden's 
Act). This provision, which provides: 
No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon or by reason of any representation 
or assurance made or given concerning or relating to the character, conduct, credit, ability, 
trade or dealings of any other person, to the intent or purpose that such other person may 
obtain credit, money, or goods upon, unless such representation or assurance shall be made 
in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith. 
The apparently meaningless reference to "Obtain credit, money or goods 
upon" which appears in the text of the statute, has been judicially determined 
to mean "obtain money or goods on creditd0. As the Law Commission noted 
l9 In May 1987. 
20 See Diamanti v. MarteNi [I9231 N.Z.L.R. 663, 667). 
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in its ~ e ~ o r t ~ ' ,  the earlier draft Bills had suggested it should be re-enacted 
as an amendment to the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956, but this would 
be inappropriate as the statute is of relevance in tort as well as contract. 
Indeed, the provision may have very serious effects in the field of negligent 
misrepresentation. The case for its preservation cannot, however, be said to 
be obvious. 
4. Other preserved enactments 
There are certain other miscellanea which have been preserved, simply because 
there is no satisfactory alternative, and any substitution would appear clumsier 
than preservation. One obvious example is the preservation of the Calendar 
(New Style) Act 1750 (24 Geo. 2 c.23); another is the retention of the Fires 
Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774. 
It is perhaps not surprising, also, to see the retention of two old statutes 
concerning set-off, the acts of 1728 and 1734~~ ,  since these have been the subject 
of recent judicial noticez3. Few would think it other than appropriate to preserve 
such important enactments as the Wills Act 1837 (7 Will. 4 and 1 %ct., c.26) 
and the Wills Act Amendment Act 1852 (15 and 16 Vkt., c.24). Nor is it 
surprising that the decision should be taken to retain the Fugitive Offenders 
Act 1881 (44 and 45 Vict., c.69) and the Fugitive Offenders (Protected States) 
Act 1915 (5 and 6 Geo. 5., c.39). 
There are, however, a number of statutes retained which at earlier stages 
both the Parliamentary Draftsman and the Law Commission would have 
deleted - the leading example being the legislation dealing with naval prizes 
in time of war24. As with some other areas, the case for preservation in this 
form, if at all, is not immediately apparent. 
V PRESERVATION O F  THE COMMON LAW 
The most important difference between the Law Commission draft Bill and 
the final statute is that the Imperial Laws Application Act includes a provision 
as to the applicability of the rules of common law and equity in this country. 
This is section 5, which provides: 
After the commencement of this act, the common law of England (including the principles and 
rules of equity), so far as it was part of the laws of New Zealand immediately before the 
commencement of this act, shall continue to he part of the laws of New Zealand. 
This provision clearly safeguards the position of the multitude of changes 
and developments in the common law since 1840. The form in which it is 
expressed may, however, have considerably wider implications. 
Until relatively recently, the New Zealand judiciary accepted the unitary 
view of the common law - that it was one and indivisible. Adherence to 
this attitude required that the New Zealand courts should, as they did almost 
21  "Report" p.28. 
22 2 Geo. 2, c.22 and 8 Geo. 2, c.24 
23 See Tony Lee Motors Ltd v. M.S. MacDonald & Son (1974) Ltd. [I9811 2 N.Z.L.R. 281, 
24 
288. 
The Prize Acts preserved are the Naval Prize Act 1864, the Prize Courts Act 1894, the 
Prize Courts (Procedure) Act 1914, the Prize Courts Act 1915, the Naval Prize (Procedure) 
Act 1916 and the Prize Act 1939. 
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without argument or question, apply the common law as it had developed 
in England, saving only such rules as were clearly inapplicable to the 
circumstances of a developing colony. This required a constant preparedness 
to deviate from their own earlier decisions when the House of Lords or the 
Privy Council issued a fresh pronouncement on any major issue2'. It has become 
clear in more recent years that the New Zealand Court of Appeal is far more 
prepared now to select for itself those developments of the common law which 
it will adopt (including indeed the rules as to precedent26. Such a display 
of independence, even in the face of pressures for uniformity expressed by 
the Privy may now be strengthened since the provisions of section 
5 of the Imperial Laws Application Act can be said to amount to legislative 
recognition that the common law is not uniform. A statement that only the 
common law so far as it was a part of our law before the act is to continue 
surely implies that new developments do not automatically become part of 
the law of this country. The argument that the New Zealand courts do not 
have to follow the decisions of the Privy Council in appeals from other 
jurisdictions if there are significantly different circumstances and a substantial 
body of established case law operating in this country28 may now be claimed 
to rest as much on statutory grounds as on considerations of policy. 
In general, the decisions to repeal any statute which was not obviously 
obsolete were made as a result of enquiries to interested parties, Government 
Departments and the like, which ensured, for the most part, retention of only 
those statutes for which there could possibly be some relevant application. 
Thus several statutes regulating matters to do with colonial clergymen of the 
Anglican church were set down for repeal only after the Anglican church 
confirmed that it had no objection to repealz9; some legislation relating to 
deed system land was repealed only after it was clear that there could be 
no practical need for the statutes to continue30. It must be presumed that 
a similar process of consultation resulted in the otherwise puzzling repeal of 
all statutes relating to Notaries Public - leaving this country with no statutory 
recognition or regulation of the position31. The clearing away of so much 
legislative deadwood can only be of long-term benefit - though of course 
it has also reduced the picturesque aspects of some elements of our inheritance. 
Among the less important of its effects are the purging from the statute 
25 An attitude that reached its apotheosis in Smith v. Wellington Woollen Manufacturing Co. 
Ltd. [I9561 N.Z.L.R. 491. 
26 See Collector of Customs v. Lawrence Publishing Co. Ltd. [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 404. 
27 See Attorney-General of St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla v. Reynolds [I9801 A.C. 637 
and de Lasala v. de Lasala [I9801 A.C. 546. 
28 See Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners v. Gibbs Bright & Co. [I9741 A.C. 810, adopted 
in Collector of Customs v. Lawrence Publishing Co. a d  [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 404 
29 E.g. the Colonial Clergy Act 1819, 59 Geo. 3 c.60 and the statute of 1786, 26 Geo. 3 c. 
84, concerning the consecration of bishops abroad. 
30 E.g. the Act of 1692 4 Will. and Mar. c.16, forbidding clandestine mortgages - this could 
only have applied to those tiny amounts of deed system land never brought under the Land 
Transfer Act nor registered under the old Deeds Registration system. 
' The relevant legislation was the Public Notaries Act 1801 (41 Geo. 3 c.79). In earlier drafts 
of the Bill, it was noted that a replacement statute was in contemplation (Imperial Laws 
Application Bill 1986, p.xvi.) 
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book of some of the more peculiar accidents of the legislative process in past 
years, such as the adoption by the English Acts Act 1855 of the statute 17 
and 18 Victoria c.24, described as " An act to amend the law relating to 
the administration of the estates of deceased persons ". The statute on that 
topic is in fact 17 and 18 Vict. c.113. The act actually adopted in 1858 was 
the Income Tax Act 1854 (U.K.). Although the statute appears never to have 
been the subject of judicial scrutiny in any reported case, it would be interesting 
to know if many lawyers advised their clients over the years on the basis 
of an English statute never properly adopted in this country. 
Alas, also gone are such wonderful, if never-observed, curiosities as the 
Observance of the 5th of November Act 1606 (3 Ja. 1, c.1) and the Observance 
of 29 May Act 1660 (12 Cha. 2, c.14), which required the Anglican Bishops 
of England and all the colonies overseas to preach sermons of thanksgiving 
to commemorate, respectively, the escape of James I from the Gunpowder 
plot and the restoration of Charles 11. 
Whether the repeal of a statute of 1818~', which prohibited the charging 
of fees for the drawing up of a pardon was motivated by the laudable desire 
for law reform or by a desire to establish the "user pays" philosophy within 
the Justice Department must remain a matter for speculation. 
On a much more serious note, the Imperial Laws Application Act does 
give rise on one respect to serious questions of constitutional significance. 
Among the acts repealed is the English Laws Act 1908. This, and its 1858 
predecessor, declared that the laws of England as at the 14th of January 1840 
were to be in force in New Zealand. The importance of that date is clear 
to all constitutional lawyers - it was the date of the Proclamation, in Sydney, 
by Governor Gipps of New South Wales of the intention of the British Crown 
to extend sovereignty to New Zealand. In that the English Laws Act amounted 
to a legislative recognition of that date, rather than the date of the Treaty 
of Waitangi or any subsequent proclamation by Captain Hobson, as being 
the fundamental date for the commencement of British rule in New Zealand, 
the Imperial Laws Application Act marks a shift in the proclaimed constitutional 
foundations for New Zealand. Such a shift may well be overdue, but it is 
surprising to see it made in this way, and with so little discussion. It will 
be interesting to see whether the change made by the Imperial Laws Application 
Act is seen in later years as showing a Parliamentary disinclination to rely 
on the strictly British traditionalist view of the acquisition of sovereignty in 
New Zealand. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Although there are a number of matters in which it is possible to be critical 
of the Imperial Laws Application Act, it must be adjudged, overall, as a 
remarkably sound piece of legislation. The range of legislation that had to 
be covered and, at times, the conflicting views as to the appropriate course 
to pursue must have presented the Parliamentary Draftsmen, and the researchers 
for the Law Commission with a task of daunting proportions. That they have 
succeeded so well in preparing a coherent act and reached what are, generally, 
obviously correct conclusions as to the statutes to repeal or to preserve is 
a tribute to their industry and skill. Several of the major deficiencies of the 
32  58 Geo. 3, c.29. 
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Imperial Laws Application Act are those inherent in its consolidatory nature. 
It is to be hoped that at some future time, the act will be reviewed and some 
issues reconsidered. The long-awaited abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, 
which will require amendments to the Imperial Laws Application Act, may 
provide a suitable occasion for such a review. Until the time of any such 
review, the Imperial Laws Application Act must stand as an example of a 
very good, but not perfect, piece of law reform. 
